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dotyczące bieżących spraw PSFUK
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HISTORIA GŁÓWNEGO BIURA PSFUK PRZY MCGUINNESS BLVD. OPRACOWANA PRZEZ DYREKTORÓW PSFUK LEONA KOKOSZKĘ I ZYGMUNTA STASZEWSKIEGO, 1-go Marca, 2014r.
Zakup budynku przy 100 McGuinness Blvd. Na początku 1996 roku Rada Dyrektorów PSFUK zaczęła się rozglądać za lokalizacją dla biur administracyjnych na Greenpoincie. Dostępna była nieruchomość przy 100 McGuiness Blvd., której właścicielem był American Legion. Zatrudniono architekta Harolda Weinberga do oceny nieruchomości z architektonicznego punktu widzenia. Wartość tej nieruchomości została wyceniona na $ 600,000 przez R.J. Sar Associates oraz na $ 820,000 przez firmę Volpe. 8-ego lipca 1996 roku podpisano kontrakt o wartości $ 1,030.000. Nieruchomość została zakupiona 11 lipca 1996 roku za całkowitą sumę $ 1,054,965 (włączając wszystkie koszta) przez Alexa Malewskiego, który reprezentował PSFUK. Działania wstępne Wstępne plany zostały przygotowane przez firmę Harold Weinberg Architect w październiku 1996 roku (przed zamknięciem). W 1997 roku NCUA zażądało przedstawienia studium wykonalności konwersji budynku na lokalny oddział oraz siedzibę zarządu. Nie wiadomo jednak czy taka analiza została przeprowadzona. W dniu 24.10.2000r. istniejącą nieruchomość wyceniono na $ 725,000 dolarów, natomiast roczny podatek od nieruchomości na $ 25,426. W dniu 24.10.2000r. oszacowano koszt rekonfiguracji i przebudowy istniejącego budynku (ok. 18,400 stóp kwadratowych całkowitej powierzchni) na $ 1,940,000. Konkurs na projekt budynku W 1997 roku podjęto decyzję o konwersji istniejącego budynku na oddział PSFUK. W dniu 7/7/1997 za angażowano firmę Kris Kozłowski Architect do przeprowadzenia wstępnej analizy zagospodarowania przestrzennego oraz projektu wstępnego za $ 99,000 (z dodatkowymi kosztami, płatnymi w wysokosci $ 75.00 / godz. dla architekta i $ 45.00 / godz. dla projektanta). Dokumenty te nie były dostępne w 2014 roku. W dniu 23.10.2001 Prezes P-SFUK Bortnik zarekomendował czterech polsko- amerykańskich architektow: Chrisa Kozłowskiego, Jerzego Leśniaka, Toma Rybaka i Bogdana Cybulskiego do przygotowania wstępnej wizualizacji budynku w cenie 5.000 dolarów każdy. 25/04/2002 architekci zaprezentowali swoje projekty Radzie i udziałowcom do oceny. 28/052002 Rada wybrała jako finalistów Kozłowskiego i Cybulskiego oraz poprosiła ich o przedstawienie swoich kosztorysów. Na zebraniu Rady w dniu 28/05/2002 Dyrektor Andrzej Kamiński postawił wniosek, aby wybrać Kozłowskiego, który zaproponował najtańszą wersję, jako architekta projektu. Wniosek ten został poparty również przez Dyrektor Bożenę Kamiński, ale nie przeszedł. Z kolei Andrzej Olszewski zproponował, aby wybrać jako projektanta Cybulskiego i wniosek ten został poparty przez Bortnika. W czasie dyskusji członkowie Zarządu zażądali, aby licencję Cybulskiego oraz jego polisę ubezpieczeniową poddać weryfikacji. Z dostępnych dokumentów nie wynika czy taką weryfikację przeprowadzono i czy Rada zdawała sobie sprawę z tego, że Cybulski nie poisiadał certyfikatu, który upoważniałby go do wykonywania zawodu architekta na terenie Stanu Nowy Jork. Jego firma Cybo Group nie miała w tym czasie autoryzacji Departamentu Edukacji Stanu Nowy Jork do świadczenia usług architektonicznych. W dniu 18/06/2002 Rada zaaprobowała wybór Cybulskiego jako architekta projektu. 13/032002 Cybulski przedstawił Kontrakt AIA B171 dla stadium projektu i konstrukcji przy 10% prowizji za usługi, zakładając, że koszt konstrukcji wyniesie $ 3,5 mln plus dodatkowo 8% prowizji od kwoty, która przekroczy limit $ 3,5 mln. W dniu 13/09/2002 Cybulski przedstawił zmieniony kontrakt, tym razem na budynek o powierzchni 30-u tys. stóp kwadratowych oraz swoją prowizję w wysokości 8% od całkowitych kosztów konstrukcji. 24/09/2002 Biuro Adwokackie Malewski i Boccio, po dokonaniu przeglądu kontraktu zaproponowanego przez Cybulskiego, wydało krytyczną opinię o nim, wskazując, że aż 85% kosztów zostało przypisane do fazy projektowania a jedynie 15% do fazy oferty i konstrukcji. Biuro Adwokackie zaproponowało odrzucenie kontraktu. W dniu 30/09/2002 Dyrektor Matyszczyk zarekomendował warunkowe zaaprobowanie kontraktu Cybulskiego. 11/10/2002 kontrakt Cybulskiego został zrewidowany przez renomowaną firmę prawniczą Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP. Wprowadzono wiele zmian i dodatkowych punktów, włączając w to 10% prowizję opartą o koszta konstrucji w wysokości $ 3,5 mln i żadnych podwyżek w przypadku korzystania z podwykonawców konsultantów oraz wymóg, że architekt jest zobowiązany dostarczyć kompletny zestaw planów budowlanych w elektronicznym formacie AutoCAD. Sprawa PSFCU vs. Beata Galdi
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Bieżące Sprawy sądowe PSFCU
Oni są winni, a my za to płacimy
Sprawę z Oscarem Mielczarkiem poprzednia przewodnicząca Rady Dyrektorów Wierzbowska zamknięta ugodą.
Ubezpieczenie naszej Unii Kredytowej zapłaciło byłemu Dyrektorowi Wykonawczemu około $1,500,000 odszkodowania za dyskryminacje, której najprawdopodobniej dopuścili się członkowie Rady Dyrektorów
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Polish & Slavic Fed. Credit Union v Saar
| [*1] Polish & Slavic Fed. Credit Union v Saar 2013 NY Slip Op 23112 Decided on April 3, 2013 Supreme Court, Kings County Schmidt, J. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the printed Official Reports. Decided on April 3, 2013 Supreme Court, Kings County Polish & Slavic Federal Credit Union, Plaintiff, against Ronald J. Saar, individually, and R.J. SAAR ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants. 12380/10 Plaintiff Attorney: Smith, Stratton, Wise, Heher & Brennan, LLP, 100 Park Avenue, Suite 1600, New York, NY 10017 Defendant Attorney: L'Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Contini, LLP, 1001 Franklin Avenue, Garden City, NY 11530 David I. Schmidt, J. Upon the foregoing papers, defendants Ronald J. Saar, individually, and R.J. Saar Associates, Inc. (collectively, "Saar") move for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff Polish & Slavic Federal Credit Union cross-moves for an order consolidating this action with an action entitled Polish & Slavic Federal Credit Union v Beata Galdi (King County Index No. 23591/11)(the "Galdi action").Plaintiff, a federally chartered credit union, brings this action against Saar alleging that it conducted faulty appraisals on two properties in conjunction with a mortgage loan made by plaintiff to one of its members, Beata Galdi. The first loan, in the amount of $2,000,000.00, was secured by the property located at 134 North Main Street in East Hampton, New York (East Hampton property). The second loan, in the amount of $2,300,000.00, was secured by the property located at 24 Cliff Road in Amagansett, New York (Amagansett property). The loans were approved by plaintiff based on appraisals by Saar which determined the estimated market value (EMV) of the East Hampton property at $3,500,000 and the EMV of the Amagansett property at $3,000,000.00 as of May 21, 2007. According to the complaint, in determining the EMVs of the two properties Saar deviated from the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisers (USPA), such as using properties situated in a different neighborhood for comparable sales and applying excessive adjustments to those comparable sales, resulting in EMVs substantially higher then the properties' actual value. Plaintiff alleges that the actual value of the East Hampton property as of May 21, 2007 did not exceed $1,425,000 while the actual value of the Amagansett property as of May 21, 2007 did not exceed $1,955,000. Plaintiff maintains that it relied on the allegedly inflated appraisals in advancing the loans to Galdi, which loans would not have been approved had they exceeded seventy percent of the [*2]EMVs of the respective properties. Galdi has since defaulted in payment on the loans, and the two properties are now the subject of foreclosure actions in Suffolk County Supreme Court. Plaintiff asserts causes of action against Saar for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, violation of General Business Law [GBL] § 349 and breach of contract. In each of the causes of action, plaintiff alleges that the malfeasance of Saar in producing the appraisal "caused plaintiff to approve the Galdi Loans and sustain monetary injury well in excess of $100,000." In its motion for summary judgment, Saar contends that the action must be dismissed as premature since plaintiff has not yet sustained any pecuniary loss, that the causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud and negligent misrepresentation must be dismissed since appraisals are matters of opinion and not fact, that plaintiff's cause of action under GBL § 349 must be dismissed as Saar's conduct was not consumer oriented and that the causes of action for breach of contract must be dismissed as duplicative of the negligence cause of action. The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). Failure to make such prima facie showing requires a denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (id.) The proof submitted to the court should be scrutinized carefully in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion (see Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404 [1957]). Saar's summary judgment motion does not address the truth or falsity of plaintiff's allegations, but rather is directed toward the facial sufficiency of plaintiff's causes of action.With respect to its contention that the instant action is premature, Saar argues that plaintiff cannot assert a claim of actual loss based on the inflated appraisals until the subject properties are sold in the foreclosure actions for an amount less than their appraised value. In support of this argument, however, Saar improperly relies on cases where the claims were brought pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). In those cases, the courts held that a cause of action does not accrue under RICO until "the amount of damages becomes clear and definite." Insofar as there could be no "clear and definite" amount of damages until the allegedly undersecured properties were sold in foreclosure, the plaintiffs could not establish the requisite injury under the statute. In this matter, however, plaintiff need only allege that it suffered some actual loss as a result of the inflated appraisals. In a breach of contract action, "damages are properly ascertained as of the date of the breach,' and the injured party has a duty to mitigate'" (see White v Farrell, ___ NY3d ___ , 2013 NY Slip Op 01870 [2013] quoting Brushton—Moira Cent. School Dist. v. Thomas Assoc., 91 NY2d 256, 262—263 [1998]). Plaintiff alleges that it has been damaged by having been induced to make the multi-million dollar loans by fraudulently or negligently inflated appraisals, and that it would not have made the loans (which are now in default) if it was provided with the true market values of the subject properties (see Rodin Rodin Props.Shore Mall v Ullman, 253 AD2d 403, 404 [1998]). While the amount recovered by plaintiff at the foreclosure sales of the properties may have a bearing on the ultimate measure of damages, since plaintiff is presently asserting actual loss as the result of its reliance on the allegedly inflated appraisals, the instant action is not premature. Saar next argues that the causes of action sounding in fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud and negligent misrepresentation are without merit since an appraisal is a non-actionable opinion, rather than a statement of fact. While appraisals, generally, are statements of opinion which may not form the basis of a fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation action (see Mandarin Trading Ltd. v Wildenstein, 65 AD3d 448, 450 [2009], affd 16 NY3d 173 [2011]; Stuart v Tomasino, 148 AD2d 370, 372 [1989]), "an assessment of market value that is based upon misrepresentations concerning existing facts may support a cause of action for fraud" (Flandera v AFA Am., Inc., 78 AD3d 1639, 1640 [2010]; see Rodin Props.-Shore Mall v Ullman, 264 AD2d 367, 368-369 [1999]; see also Cristallina v Christie, Manson & Woods Intl., 117 AD2d 284, 294-295 [1986]). [*3] Plaintiff maintains that the appraisal is based on specific misrepresentations of fact, including statements that the adjustments to the comparable sales figures are within proper USPA standards and FNMA guidelines. Specifically, plaintiffs state that Saar misrepresented that the comparable sales grid comprised of properties located in the same neighborhood as the East Hampton property (East Hampton North) when in fact it included properties located in the Village of East Hampton, where home values are significantly higher. Plaintiffs also allege misrepresentations that properties in the comparable sales grids were similar to the subject properties as to street frontage and lot shape, and that total floor areas were based on those of the main residence on a property, rather than all structures on a property. Thus, to the extent that the EMVs of the subject properties were extrapolated from misrepresentations of factual data, the appraisal itself may be considered a factual representation rather than a mere matter of opinion. As a result, that part of Saar's motion for summary judgment dismissing the fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud and negligent misrepresentation causes of action is denied. GBL § 349 declares as unlawful "[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state" (GBL § 349 [a]). Section 349 is directed at wrongs against the consuming public (see Oswego Laborers''Local 214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 NY2d 20, 24 [1995]). "To assert a viable claim under GBL § 349(a), a plaintiff must plead that (1) the challenged conduct was consumer-oriented, (2) the conduct or statement was materially misleading, and (3) damages" (Lum v New Century Mortgage Corp., 19 AD3d 558, 559 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 706 [2005]). For conduct to be consumer-oriented it must be demonstrated that it had "a broader impact on consumers at large" (see Oswego Laborers''Local 214 Pension Fund, 85 NY2d at 26; Sheth v New York Life Ins. Co., 273 AD2d 72, 73 [2000]). Under New York law, "the term consumer' is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for personal, family or household purposes'" (Cruz v NYNEX Info. Resources, 263 AD2d 285, 289 [2000], citing GBL §§ 399-c, 399-p [1][c]; General Obligations Law § 5-327[1][a]; CPLR 105[f]; UCC § 9-109[1]. Thus, private contract disputes that are unique, private in nature, or involve a so-called "single-shot" transaction do not fall with the statute's ambit (Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund, 85 NY2d at 26). While certain services performed in conjunction with the sale and mortgaging of residential property may fit within the ambits of the statute, the alleged deceptive acts in the transaction here are more akin to a private contract dispute. Significantly, the alleged deceptive acts were not directed toward a "consumer"such as a home buyer, but rather toward a financial institution receiving services in furtherance of a business prurpose. As a result, the court does not find GBL § 349 applicable under the circumstances. Accordingly, that part of Saar's motion to dismiss the fifth cause of action under GBL § 349 is granted. Saar claims that plaintiff's two causes of action for breach of contract (asserted against R.J. Saar Associates, Inc. and Ronals J. Saar, individually) are dupilcative of the negligence cause of action and must be dismissed accordingly. However, "[i]t is a well established principle that a simple breach of contract should not be considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the contract has been violated" (Clark—Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70 NY2d 382, 389 [1987] see Sergeants Benev. Assn. Annuity Fund v Renck, 19 AD3d 107, 111 [2005]). In its negligence cause of action, plaintiffs fail to allege that Saar owed a legal duty to them outside of the contract. Thus, it is actually the negligence cause of action which should be subject to dismissal as duplicative of plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. Insofar as Saar does not explicitly request dismissal of the negligence claim on this basis, that part of Saar's motion for summary judgment to dismiss the breach of contract causes of action is denied. Plaintiff cross-moves to consolidate this matter with the Galdi action. "The power to order consolidation rests in the sound discretion of the court and should be granted in the interest of judicial economy where common issues of law or fact exist" (Sun v City of New York, 99 AD3d 673 [2012]). The two actions sought to be consolidated, while based on the same loan transaction and which both include general allegations of fraud, are otherwise not factually related. The Galdi action [*4]involves allegations that the borrower misrepresented her financial status or ability to repay the loan in loan applications, while the instant action involves negligence and/or fraud on the part of the appraiser in determining the subject properties' market value. There is no assertion by plaintiff that Galdi acted in collusion with Saar to fraudulently obtain the loans or had any relationship or connection with each other beyond Galdi's payment of Saar's fees for the appraisals. Under the circumstances, the court finds that consolidation of the actions is not appropriate. Accordingly, Saar's motion for summary judgment is granted only to the extent that the fifth cause of action under GBL § 349 is dismissed. The remaining parts of the motion are denied. Plaintiff's cross motion for consolidation is denied. The forgoing constitutes the decision and order of the court. E N T E R, J. S. C. |
Usunięci przez Zebranie Specjalne w 2012 roku, byli Dyrektorzy Unii sądzą
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